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In this paper we question the hypothesis of full rationality in the context of job changing behaviour, 
via simple econometric explorations on microdata drawn from WHIP (Worker Histories Italian 
Panel). 
Workers’ performance is compared at the end of a three-year time window that starts when choices 
are expressed, under the accepted notion that the main driving forces of job change are future real 
wages and expected job quality.  Bounded rationality suggests that individuals will search for new 
options capable to attain “satisfactory” targets  (aspirations levels, standards, norms),  based on 
conditions prevailing in their own local environments.  Our empirical strategy consists of 
appropriately defining such environments (cells) and observing the ex-post individual performance 
in relation to the degree of dispersion, clustering and mobility within and between cells. 
Under full rationality the following are to be expected:  
-  high inter-cell mobility; 
-  large dispersion around the targets; 
-  clustering in the vicinity of the efficiency frontier.  
None of the above expectations are confirmed in this exploration.   Our conclusion is that workers 
behave according to principles of rationality that seem distant from those of “full rationality” 
assumed in the vast majority of contemporary empirical (and theoretical) studies.  The idea of 
“bounded rationality” à la Simon provides a better fit to our observations. 
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1.  Motivation  
This paper is not on job changing behaviour per se.  Nor do we explain how choices take 
place.  It is an empirical exploration aimed at testing a hypothesis of bounded rationality against one 
of full rationality.  Job changing is the context in which our economic agents operate: we observe 
worker histories after a relatively long time since the decision to move or stay, and assess ex post 
whether the agents – movers and stayers - performed more or less rationally.  Our conclusion is that 
workers behave according to principles of rationality that adhere more to the idea of “bounded 
rationality” à la Simon than to the principle of “full rationality” assumed in the vast majority of 
contemporary empirical (and theoretical) studies.  
We hypothesize (as Simon did a long time ago, and others have done in the recent past)  that 
individuals set targets / aspiration levels on the basis of “local knowledge”, and choose “satisficing” 
options.  Search and choice take place under limited information and computational ability.  The 
agents’ happiness depends on the difference between output  y  and  aspiration level  y*  (alias  
reference point, alias  norm in Akerlof’s terminology). More sophisticated versions of this model 
embody “loss aversion” with kinked preferences at y*.  In this exploration y* consists of a  two-
dimensional vector of  long run wage growth  and  risk-on-the-job. Recognizing the specific   
decision rules that lead individual choices is, for the time being, out of reach: while we assume that 
a “satisficing” option will be selected, we cannot specify whether it will be the first, or second, or n-
th option under scrutiny, and how close to y* it will have to be.   According to Simon and followers, 
the  aspiration level is evolutionarily updated  over time on the basis of performance and learning 
mechanisms.  In this exploration, however, and at least for the time being, we shall neglect the 
dynamic evolution of individual aspirations. 
Our empirical strategy consists of three steps: (i) building the environments in which “local 
knowledge” may reasonably apply  (cells, defined by the intersection of industry, firms size and 
geography); (ii) defining reference points (aspiration levels) as a vector of wage growth and risk-on-
the-job targets relevant to each cell;  (iii) observing the ex-post individual performance in relation to 
the degree of dispersion, clustering and mobility within and between cells.      
Under full rationality the following are to be expected:  
-  high inter-cell mobility; 
-  large dispersion around the reference points; 
-  clustering in the vicinity of the efficiency frontier.  
None of the above expectations are confirmed in this exploration.    3
We conclude that workers behave according to principles of rationality that seem distant 
from those of “full rationality”.  The idea of “bounded rationality” à la Simon provides a better fit to 
our observations. 
More specifically, the performance of movers and stayers is compared at the end of a three-
year time window that starts when choices are expressed, under the accepted notion that the main 
driving forces of job change are future real wages and expected job quality. A rational outcome of 
the job matching process - not necessarily implying utility-maximizing individuals – implies a 
positive tradeoff between  future wages and risk-on-the-job.    
Work histories, mobility, job changes and wages are observed in a large employer-employee 
linked longitudinal panel (WHIP, Work Histories Italian Panel).  Job quality per se is not: we use as 
a reasonable proxy an indicator of job stability (denominated “risk-on-the-job”) for which 
appropriate measures can be obtained.   Movers are selected in order to exclude all those who have 
moved involuntarily, i.e. following or pre-empting collective layoffs.   
The exploration is complemented by a quasi-counterfactual, i.e. restricting the comparison 
of the movers to that of their matching stayers  (co-workers of similar skills in the same firm of 
origin, who have not moved or have decided not to move). This too provides additional strength to 
our intuitions.  
In recent years various papers have provided evidence of bounded rationality in a variety of  
specific case studies reviewed below. The underlying idea here is along similar lines.  The novelty 
of this paper is that we investigate the presence of bounded rationality by means of simple 
econometric explorations on panel data that have already been used in the recent past to test 
standard theories of job changing behaviour.
2  Looking at the data from such perspective, the results 
appear more consistent with the idea of bounded rationality à la Simon than models of fully 
rational, utility maximizing agents.   
The plan of this article is as follows: par. 2 introduces the idea that unobserved 
heterogeneity may hide bounded rationality.  Par. 3  provides a short survey of examples of 
bounded rationality reported in recent literature.  Par. 4  presents  the data,  and par. 5 describes how 
the main performance indicators are measured.  In  par. 6 we introduce a pseudo utility function 
used as a benchmark for the definition of reference points and the empirical implementation that 
follows in  par. 7 and 8.  In par. 9  we estimate a reasonable tradeoff between wage growth and risk-
on-the-job.  The quasi-counterfactual analysis on voluntary movers and stayers is illustrated in par. 
10,  while par. 11  suggests that hints of sound rationality are (fortunately) visible also in our 
exploration.  Par. 12 concludes.          
                                                 
2 B. Contini and C. Villosio  (2005),  in B. Contini, U. Trivellato (eds.) "Eppur si muove. Dinamiche e persistenze nel 
mercato del lavoro italiano", Il Mulino, pp. 567-595.         4
2. Unobserved heterogeneity or bounded rationality?    
Any theory of economic behaviour predicts that workers engaged in a dynamic environment 
may at some point consider mobility as a profitable alternative to their current position, and will 
evaluate options on the basis of two main elements: future expected earnings and expected job 
safety.   
In a world of utility maximizing agents,  everything unrelated to the arguments of the utility 
function will be hidden within the black box of unobserved heterogeneity.  The standard 
explanation of why one could observe an efficiency frontier in the wage growth - job safety  space  
reserved to few agents, with all the remaining ones dominated inside the frontier, is that any trade-
off, however fragile, is an average regression with large residual variability attributable to 
unobservable characteristics of the individual workers.  
Heterogeneity implies - inter alia - that positions strongly dominated  in the interior of the 
wage growth - risk-of-job-loss  frontier may correspond to optimal choices derived from 
unobservable multi-objective individual preferences:  Mr. X is a stayer who “loves the amenities of 
Taormina where  he is currently working”;  Mr. Y  is a mover who has switched to a new job 
because “he hated his former boss”;  Mr. Z  does what he does because he is a fool.  An alternative 
explanation runs in terms of unobservable constraints to the actions of each individual (all kind of 
transaction costs
3, family constraints, etc.).  Unfortunately both of these arguments - allowing  any 
point in the wage growth – job safety  space to be the optimum of some unknown and sufficiently 
constrained preference function -  leads us trapped in a black box where any empirical argument 
aimed at understanding  how people make choices becomes irrelevant.   Rationality is assumed and 
cannot be disproved.
4    
Considerations other than future pay and job stability may well contribute to explain  job 
changing behaviour: but they simply cannot be so systematically overwhelming as to force any 
empirical evidence in the black box of unobserved heterogeneity.  If  one is seriously convinced that 
additional first order determinants of behaviour enter the picture, then these must be explicitly 
introduced in the theoretical models of job search. To our knowledge, however, this is seldom been 
done.  A more fruitful - and less demanding - approach suggests that limited rationality (à la Simon 
and followers) could be the key to this dilemma. 
                                                 
3  It is obviously commendable to single out, model and measure varieties of transaction costs. From a normative 
perspective, this is indeed a must  if policy aims at removing or reducing their negative impact. But the normative 
perspective need not be present in positive studies on how people behave, as the present one.   
4  Empirical practice neglects this question.  Instead of testing the predicted effect of utility maximization against the 
predicted effects of competing theories, economists tend to test against the non-substantive null hypothesis of no effect. 
In  Conlisk’s words (1996),  this is “something like wrestling a rag doll; it doesn’t prove anything, unless the ragdoll 
wins”.    5
Another related answer, relevant as we move into empirical grounds, is the difficulty of 
forecasting into the future when one’s individual planning horizon is reasonably long.  As it would 
be, in this particular context, the decision of an adult male to accept a new job offer or stick to his 
old position (especially where the options are scarce as in Italy during the Nineties).   Such horizon 
cannot be too long - certainly a long way from the infinite discounted horizon assumed by theorists 
of dynamic choice models – nor can it be too short – a myopic one-shot comparison between an 
outside offer and one’s reservation wage, however defined.  In this paper we experiment with a 
three-year horizon, a reasonable compromise, compatible with the available data. Empirical 
evidence strongly suggests that forecasting future scenarios is a very difficult task, which helps to 
explain the existence of strongly dominated observations.  
In order to provide convincing evidence in favour of bounded rationality, we must engage in 
a patient  job of data cleaning and removing cross and composition effects. The skeptics must be 
insured  that our reading of the data is not contaminated by prior hypotheses out of line with most of 
today’s mainstream contributions. 
 
3. A short review of literature on bounded rationality 
The concept of bounded rationality and satisfying behavior was introduced by H. Simon 
(1955 and 1986) since his early works that earned him the Nobel Prize.   R.M. Cyert, J. March,  
O.E. Willamson were among the first to systematically propound the idea in the Sixties. For almost 
two decades thereafter economists ignored Simon’s lesson.  Not until the Eighties, much to the 
merit of the growing experimental literature, has there been a true revival of interest in Simon’s 
work, and the recognition that  “..... when choice problems are hard, people often resort to simple 
rules of thumb to help them cope”
5 .   
Bounded rationality is reported in a wide variety of real instances documented in the 
beautiful survey by J. Conlisk  (1996). Investors often appear not to benefit from the possibility to 
choose portfolios for themselves  (S. Benartzi and R.H.Thaler, 2002).  The behavior of US health 
club attendants is difficult to reconcile with standard preferences and beliefs  (S. Della Vigna and U. 
Malmender, 2006).  Similar findings are also reported in studies on consumer behavior in the credit 
card industry (H. Shui and L.M. Ausubel, 2004),  portfolio performance (L. Guiso and T. Jappelli 
(2007), employee choice of 401(k) plans (B.C. Madrian and D.F. Shea, 2001), purchase  of large 
appliances (J. Hausman, 1979), purchase of flood and earthquake insurance (H. Kunreuther et al. 
1978), asset prices (D. Cutler, J. Poterba and L. Summers, 1991),  the “winner’s curse” in real 
auctions (A. Roth, 1988; O. Ashenfelter and D. Genesove, 1992). Perhaps the most interesting real 
                                                 
5 S. Benartzi and R.H. Thaler (2002)   6
life experiment is reported  by E. Fehr and L. Goette (2007): the setting consists of a bycicle 
messenger service where workers were free to choose hours worked and effort. The authors 
document a large negative response of hours to wage increase and explain it with reference 
dependent preferences. 
Several factors are indicated as explanation of  bounded rationality: overconfidence about 
self-control and future efficiency, overestimation of future attendance, distaste for psychological 
transaction costs, limited memory, fallacious commitment devices, time inconsistency, deliberation 
costs.  In a series of by now classic contributions G. Akerlof  and co-authors (1982, 1984, 1991)  
introduce concepts well known to sociologists but ignored by his contemporary economists: 
cognitive dissonance (the bias of fitting beliefs to convenience), salience (the bias of attaching 
undue weight to recent events), social norms and gift advantages.  In his presidential address to the 
AEA 2007 G. Akerlof writes  “The role of norms can be represented in people’s preferences by 
modifying the utility function to include losses of utility insofar as they, or others, fail to live up to 
their standards”. R.W. Cooper (1999) emphasizes the role of strategic complementarity  and 
strategic substitutability as determinants of aggregate outcomes.  
Arguments on learning and adaptation suggest that, if today things have gone wrong, 
tomorrow they’ll go better. Unfortunately there is no general reason to believe that markets 
automatically render individual decision more rational over time.  In long run it may work that way. 
Learning to improve and re-adapt one’s performance – by trial and error – may, however,  take 
minutes or years, depending on the context.  In experimental situations adjustment may take place 
very rapidly (but this evidence involves stylized laboratory settings with small stakes and 
inexperienced decision makers who devote little effort to their choices);  in shopping at the 
supermarket it may take a few days after buying and tasting a low quality marmelade. But in 
domains where the planning horizon is long and the stakes are high, like most life cycle decisions as 
well as technological evolutions of firms, learning and adaptation take time. In the early careers of  
young persons job changing is frequent for both workers and firms are in search of the right match: 
here too learning is slow. Finding a job is often costly and risky;  “understanding if you like it” 
could take years; deciding to leave a post for a new one is a hard decision that may have adverse 
effects on the household’s well-being and serenity.  
Finally, it deserves recalling that even such “maestri” like A. Goldberger (1989) and K.J. 
Arrow (1986) noted that the utility maximization hypothesis has little empirical content without 
strong auxiliary assumptions on the utility function and other model ingredients. And, so they 
added, stating auxiliary assumptions is often little different from stating empirical predictions   7
outright, as a sociologist might.  In this sense, the utility maximization hypothesis merely 
“packages” the prediction.    
 
4. Data 
Our data are drawn from  WHIP (Work Histories Italian Panel), an employer-employee 
longitudinal random sample of all Italian employees of the private sector, observed at monthly 
frequency  (at the time available from 1985 to 1998, now updated to 2003).  The sample-population 
ratio is 1:90.    We use a closed panel of male individuals working full-time in the private sector, 
aged between 30 and 40 in 1986 (over 7000 individuals), and observe their histories and job 
changes from 1986 through 1996.  Gender, age and working hours  restrictions respond to the 
necessity to minimize heterogeneity of behaviour unrelated to job changing activities (maternity and 
child care, retirement choices, etc.). The post change performance of movers and stayers is recorded 





5. Measurement issues 
5.1 Movers and stayers 
Analysis must be restricted to workers who have made an explicit and voluntary decision to 







Workers whose firm exits 
the market or exhibits a 
workforce decrease above 
40% between 1986 and 
1991
2723-1594 = 1129  Voluntary movers  8
offers, whether after searching or otherwise, should not enter our sample.  Upon receiving an 
outside offer all workers are faced with move or stay decisions.  Unfortunately, in the data at hand – 
for that matter in any microdata from longitudinal employer-employee datasets – there is no 
information on job offers or other elements that help to distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary decisions.  Under plausible assumptions, it is possible to single out the voluntary 
movers from those who have been forced to change job, either  because laid off or because they 
decided to pre-empt a future likely layoff. For the stayers, instead, the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary decisions is  prohibitive: for this reason we choose to neglect them from much of 
our analysis. Will such a decision distort our conclusions ? We don’t  think so.  Movers and stayers 
are individuals with similar characteristics. If the evidence supports the hypothesis of bounded 
rationality of the movers, there are good reasons to suppose that the same holds for the stayers. 
Stringent criteria are used to recognize the voluntary movers from those who switch job for 
different reasons.   Collective layoffs have been frequent in the Eighties and Nineties in the course 
of industrial restructuring, and are recognizable in our dataset.  We have chosen to eliminate all 
individuals who find a new job after such events:  in Italy the large majority will take whatever 
position is in sight, no matter how bad,  rather than staying unemployed (unemployment benefits 
have been  very modest throughout the early Nineties).   In addition we select out  all individuals  
who are found on a job in the observation period, but have been – as it were -“forced” to leave a 
preceding position in order to pre-empt a likely layoff  if the industry or firm is facing an 
unfavourable course.  These are individuals who are at work in 1991  after having switched jobs in 
the 1986-91 period:  either (i) leaving firms  that had closed and exited the market before 1991; or 
(ii) had undergone  workforce reductions before 1991  in excess of  40% of  the 1986 workforce.
6   
We cannot deal in the same way with individual layoffs. This should not, however, pose 
much of a problem as Italy’s employment protection legislation makes them a very rare event.        
We assume the planning horizon to be a three-year window that starts when choices are 
expressed. 
Thus “movers” are individuals observed in one firm in 1986 and in a different firm in 1991. 
Multiple moves between 1986 and 1991 are irrelevant for this definition. If the last relevant job 
switch occurred before 1991, say in 1990, the time window over which his performance is 
measured starts in 1990.  In most cases, therefore, the movers’ ex-post performance is observed  in 
the 1991-1994  time window;  occasionally in the 1989-1992  and  1990-1993  windows.  In such 
cases the different impact of the changing business cycle will be explicitly considered.   
                                                 
6   We have also experimented with a more stringent  10% threshold to identify the involuntary movers.   The idea was 
to avoid including quits attributable to fear of losing one’s job, at the cost of  risking the exclusion of some voluntary 
movers.  This experiment turns out to have very little impact on our results.    9
“Stayers”, instead, are individuals observed in the same firm from 1986 to 1991, although 
their career may have been interrupted by short unemployment (or temporary layoff) spells in 
between.  Their ex-post performance is always observed in the 1991-1994  time window. 
 
5.2 Wage growth  and  risk-on-the-job 
The performance of movers and stayers is assessed at the end of the three-year window that starts 
when choices are expressed. 
Real (long run) wage growth (W)  
 
 STAYERS     
w3 = average yearly nominal wage earned during the 3-year spell started in 1990: 
 
w1 = average yearly nominal wage earned at the end of 1990. 
 
 MOVERS 
w3 =average yearly wage earned during the 3-year spell after the job switch 
 
w1 = average yearly wage earned at the end of the period preceding the job switch. 
 
Nominal wages are deflated by CPI (p). 
 
W = real (long-run) wage growth   
W = w3/ p  / w1/p 
 
Risk-on-the-job  (ROJ) 
The risk-on-the-job indicator is built on the basis of  two elements: the worker-specific 
predicted likelihood of dismissal in the past 1986-91 time window, and a forward looking firm-
specific indicator of employment  trend over the subsequent three-year period 1991-94.
7  The 
former is weighted by the latter as follows:   
Risk-on-the-job  =  ROJ  =  [predicted individual likelihood of dismissal 1986-91 |   
  individual and firm of origin characteristics] / [firm employment trend  1994 / 1991]  
 
Suppose that Mr. X’s  predicted likelihood of (past) dismissal is 0.30.  If Mr. X  stays at his 
firm of origin and such firm increases employment by 50% in the next 1991-94 period. Mr. X’s  
risk-on-the-job is reduced to  0.30/(1+ 0.5) =  0.20.  If he moves to a different firm that cuts 
employment by 20%,  his risk-on-the-job increases to  0.375 =  0.30/(1-0.2).   
 
(a) likelihood of dismissal prior to 1991 
                                                 
7  The trend is calculated as follows : [ E(1994) / E(1991)  +  0.25 ].  Adding  0.25  prevents the ratio (in the 
denominator of ROJ),  from becoming  zero when the firm goes bankrupt and/or exits the market.    10
In order to estimate the likelihood of dismissal, we resort to the open panel 1986-1991, 
including all full-time male workers aged 20-50. In 1986 the number of workers on payroll is 
36,114;  of these, only 15,394 are left by 1991.  We estimate a logit separately for white and blue 
collars, against a set of covariates including age and age-square, wage, industry, location, firm size 
and firm employment trend, initial conditions and various interactions.  All the main covariates are 
highly significant (results are available). 
    
Fig. 2 displays the predictor of dismissal as a function of age and initial pay (by wage 
quintiles): the predicted likelihood  is U-shaped in age and decreasing in wage.  Not surprisingly 
prime-age workers are those at least risk of dismissal, while at high risk we find the low paid 
independently of age. Under the plausible assumption that wage and productivity are correlated, this 




(b)  projected employment trend 
Firm employment histories are observed through 1996.  The ratio between total employment 
on each firm’s payroll at the end of 1994 and in 1991 provides a simple indicator of firm-specific 
trends.  The movers’ ratio E(1994) / E(1991) is measured at the firm that made him a successful 
offer (around 1991).   Nearly two thirds of the observable firms reduce their workforce in the 1991-
                                                 
8  P. Gautier et al. (2002) investigate firm downsizing in the Netherlands. Their findings are similar to ours: at each job 
































































Average predict(OUT_91), by wage/age  11
94 period that falls around the 1993 recession: this is in line with well known trends of  the Italian 
labor market.  A striking 25% of the movers who switched jobs around 1991  end up in firms that 
exit the market before the end of 1994,  while only a more modest 10% of the stayers (who did not 
make the switch) are in the same position.  All the above individuals are at work at the end of 1994, 
implying that they have switched to a new job after the closure of their previous employer.   Not 
surprisingly, therefore,  as will be reflected in  ROJ,  the movers are much more exposed to the risk 
of job loss than the stayers:  this is an interesting and novel result for which we find no precedents. 
 
6.  A pseudo-utility function as a plausible benchmark   
As a plausible benchmark  (fully rational individuals)  we assume a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function (U)  in two arguments: the observed (ex-post) real wage growth over the future 3-year 
window  (W), and a proxy of  risk-on-the-job  (ROJ)   
 
U   =    [(W)**n]  / [ROJ**m] 
 
Workers accept job offers on the basis of two criteria: 
 
- if the wage offer is “sufficiently high” (i.e. higher than some unknown reservation wage); 
 
- if the offered position is subjectively perceived to be “sufficiently stable” (i.e. with a low 
probability of being dismissed or forced to leave). 
 
Both arguments imply a subjective judgement on the future evolution of earnings and on the 
quality of the job. In fact, neither W, nor ROJ are known a priori.   
 
The robustness of the hypothesis of bounded rationality  may be tested also by letting  n and 
m  take different values.  
 
7. Different performance of movers and stayers  
Some results of this investigation are in accord with standard literature, some are not.  For 
instance, as is found in many studies on job changing behavior,  movers do somewhat better than 
stayers in terms of wage growth. But movers are in a worse position in terms of risk-on-the-job.  
The comparative performance of movers and stayers, measured by a utility function that embodies 
both elements depends on the relative weight given to each.  Unless risk-on-the-job carries a very   12
small weight compared to wage growth, the stayers appear to be  better performers than the movers. 
The implication (not surprisingly) is that the movers have a higher risk propensity than the stayers. 
 
 
Fig.  0 – Scatter of unconditional observations in the <W- ROJ >  space 
 
Previous research on these data– relative to the 1986-91 period - established the following 
results;
9  (i) the mean initial wage (1986) as well as the mean final wage (1991) of the stayers is 
higher than that of the movers; (ii) the wage growth  of the movers is slightly higher than the 
stayers'
10;  (iii) movers do better than stayers at young age (20-30), but the difference tends to 
vanish thereafter;  (iv) mover-stayer differentials are larger among white-collars than among blue-
collars. 
 
The following differences are illustrated by the cumulative functions of each performance 
indicator (fig. 3-4):  
                                                 
9 B. Contini and C.Villosio (2005), “Worker mobility, displacement, redeployment and wage dynamics”, ch. 16  in  B. 
Contini and U. Trivellato (2005).  Additional findings are reported in:  B. Contini, R. Leombruni, L. Pacelli and C. 
Villosio, “Mobility and wage dynamics in Italy”, in E. Lazear and K. Shaw (eds.), The Structure of Wages within 
Firms: Europe and the United States, Chicago,  NBER Series (forthcoming 2007). 
 
10  (i) and (ii) are widely accepted stylized facts on job changing performance.  See Lazear (1998), Topel (1991), and 
many others who have followed.    13
-  Wage growth  (W) 
Movers do better than stayers in terms of wage growth in the 3-year window following 
1991, but only beyond the median. In the low tail of the distribution we find a slight prevalence of  
stayers.  The same pattern holds for both blue and white collars (fig. 3/A).  The variance of the 
movers is slightly larger than the stayers’. 
-  Risk-on-the-job  (ROJ) 
The situation is reversed, with the stayers facing a much lower risk-of-job loss than the 
movers.  Movers appear to be risk-prone, willing to accept a higher pay at considerable cost in 
terms of job safety. At P50  the stayers’ ROJ is  0.12  against  0.16 for the movers among white-
collars; 0.12 against 0.20  among manual workers.  At P75  the difference increases to 10 p.p. (0.18 
vs. 0.28) and 14 p.p. (0.18 vs. 0.32) respectively.  Beyond P75 the differences explode (fig. 3/B).  
The ROJ variance is much larger among the movers.  
  -  Utility  U   (various parametrizations) 
With unit elasticities (+1 and  –1 respectively for numerator and denominator, corresponding 
to m=n=1) the stayers dominate the movers, with the  ROJ differential driving the result (fig. 3/C).   
About 43% of the movers are found in the first quartile of the U-distribution, against 22% of the 
stayers.  Conversely, 26% of the stayers belong to the upper quartile against  less than 20% of the 
movers.   If more weight is given to ROJ  (Fig. 4, m=1,  n=3), the stayers’ dominance is complete 
among the blue-collars, and nearly complete among the white-collars.  In the opposite case  (more 
weight to W,  with m=3, n=1),  the stayers lie above the movers through P80 of the U-distribution 
among the blue-collars, and slightly P50 among the white-collars.     14
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Figure 4 A-B 






































































































































































U  =   W**1  /  ROJ **3        blue collars
 






















































































































8. Setting “reference targets” and comparing performance 
 
Bounded rationality suggests that individuals will search for new options capable to attain 
“satisfactory” targets  (aspirations levels, standards, norms),  based on conditions prevailing in their 
own local environments.  Our first task consists, therefore, of defining such environments.  As a 
reasonable approximation we build  198 cells defined by the intersection of  11 industries, 3 firm 
sizes, 2 skill groups, 3 geographical areas.  In order to have at least 10 individuals in each cell, we 
retain only 42 cells, which leaves us with 978 workers out of 1086 in the original sample. Thus each 
cell yields the “local environment”  of all 978 individuals.  Reference points reflect conditions – 
wage growth and risk-on-the-job - prevailing in each person’s cell at the beginning of the 3-year  
time window that defines one’s planning horizon.  
Reference points may be very ambitious or relatively modest, depending on the personal 
characteristics and past of each individual.  Here we experiment with two sets of targets, the first 
modest, the second quite ambitious: 
-  y *  =  the medians  of  W  and  ROJ  within-cell 1991 - distributions   
-  y**  = the 66-th percentile of  W,  and the 33-th percentile of ROJ within-cell 1991 
distributions       
We adopt three criteria to compare each individual’s ex-post performance with his reference 
point.  
(i) count the frequency of observations contained in circles centered at  y*  and y**, 
proportional to the interdecile range  (P90 – P10) of the  U =  W / ROJ  within-cell  distribution; 
(ii)  count the frequency of observations that jointly attain y*  and y** (above both reference 
points) and  its complement, i.e. that fail to attain at least one target (below one reference 
point); 
(iii)  measure the average Euclidean distance (D) of all cell observations from  y*  and  y**. 
 
Each of these criteria helps to ascertain the soundness of the hypothesis of bounded 
rationality:  under BR one would expect a large number of observations close to the reference points 
and a reasonable number jointly attaining them.   There is no reason to expect similar results with 
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8.1  Reference points in  <W -  ROJ>  space 
 
Consider the position of the reference points  y*   in  <W – ROJ>  space: it resembles the 
unconditional scatter of individual observations  (fig. 1).
11  The  N-W  reference points strongly 
dominate those placed in the S-E  region of the plot.  Is this a surprising finding ?  No, if it the ex-
post performance of the individuals belonging to each cell (k) is clustered around y*(k).  Yes, if the 
ex-post  performance is sparcely distributed independently of  y*(k).  As will be seen below, the 
clustering is much tighter than one would expect under full rationality, where the reference points 



















8.2 Clustering around reference points 
 
For each cell we build two sets of circles centered at  y* and  y** with diameter proportional 
to the interdecile range (P90 – P10)  of the U-distribution of observations belonging to the cell.  The 
size of the circles is the same,  whether centered at y*  or   y**,  as they reflect the variability of  U 
within each cell.  The position of the circles in the <W-ROJ> space is that of the reference points  
y* and y**  themselves. 
                                                 
11  The difference with the plot of  y**  in  <W-ROJ>  space is a slight  N-W  displacement of all observations in the 
































In order to assess the clustering of observations  around the relative reference points, we 
count the observations contained in each circle.  The circles centered at  y* = [P50(W), P50(ROJ)]  
contain about 80% of the observations belonging to the corresponding cells,  while those centered at 
the more ambitious  y** = [P66(W), P33(ROJ)]  include about  90% of the observations.
12 This 
result suggests a considerable amount of clustering,  in line with hypotheses of bounded rationality.    
 
This argument in favour of BR  is strengthened  by the additional finding that the number of 
observations found beyond the theoretical efficiency frontier – defined as P90 of the standard  U- 
distribution  (m= n= 1),  positioned to the left of the graph and cutting across a few cells, is very 
small.  The only exception being those belonging to the banking-insurance industry (cells 8xy), in 
the N-W  of  fig. 6.    The result holds also for different parameters of the U-distribution (m= 1 and  
n=3;  m=3 and  n=1), reported in table 1.      
                                                 
12  The variability in circles centered  at y**  is, by construction,  larger than in circles centered at  y*, as they include 
more extreme observations.  This explains also why such circles contain a larger share of observations.   19
Table 1:  % frequency of observations beyond efficiency frontier (defined as P90 of  U - functions, 
with  m, n =  1, 3) 
 




























8.3 Attainment of the reference points 
 
Consider now the degree of joint attainment of the reference points.
13   A quick glance at 
tab. 2 suggests that it is not as high as might have been expected.  Often in the order of between 







  U=W  / ROJ**3   U = W / ROJU =  W **3 / ROJ
cell        
2LB   3    35
2LW   15    18 27
2MB   4    44
2MW    21    21 26
2SB   0    08
3LB   7    75
3LW   10    14 25
3MB   7    11 13
3MW    13    16 26
3SB   2    29
3SW   18    18 18
4LB   6    13 38
4LW   7    13 33
4MB   12    18 21
4MW    20    23 29
4SB   0    04
4SW   13    01 3
6LW   29    29 29
6MB   4    48
6MW    16    16 24
6SB   0    26
6SW   10    10 21
7LB   9    00
7LW   0    13 13
7MB   0    00
7MW    0    00
7SB   0    09
8LB   50    50 0
8LW   30    26 33
8MB   15    15 23
8MW    56    64 64
8SW   40    40 40
   20
15% and 35% of the cases with respect to  y*  (column 1 - only  3 cases out of 42,  above 50%),  
somewhat less with respect to the more ambitious target  y**  (column 2).   Joint attainment is 
slightly higher among the white-collars  (last cell digit of cell denomination is W).  
 
Table 2:  Frequencies of joint attainment of reference points 





hypothetical y* with ROJ 
(1991-94) = ROJ (1986-91) 
Y****= 
[P50(W),P50(ROJt-1)] 
cellfront below  above  below  above  below  above 
1LB 100 0  83 17 83 17 
1LW 83  17  83 17 83 17 
1MB 100  0  100 0 100 0 
1MW 100  0  100 0 100 0 
2LB 92  8  87 13 72 28 
2LW 85  15  73 27 67 33 
2MB 85  15  85 15 81 19 
2MW 84  16  74 26 74 26 
2SB 92  8  75 25 75 25 
3LB 91  9  85 15 80 20 
3LW 75  25  68 32 56 44 
3MB 91  9  84 16 82 18 
3MW 83  17  73 27 70 30 
3SB 96  4  87 13 87 13 
3SW 64  36  64 36 64 36 
4LB 88  13  75 25 69 31 
4LW 80  20  80 20 47 53 
4MB 84  16  72 28 66 34 
4MW 77  23  71 29 71 29 
4SB 76  24  62 38 62 38 
4SW 38  63  38 63 38 63 
6LW 43  57  43 57 43 57 
6MB 75  25  71 29 71 29 
6MW 84  16  80 20 80 20 
6SB 88  12  83 17 83 17 
6SW 72  28  66 34 66 34 
7LB 100 0  91 9 91 9 
7LW 50  50  50 50 50 50 
7MB 100  0  92 8 92 8 
7MW 100  0  100 0 100 0 
7SB 100 0  96 4 96 4 
8LB 100 0  100 0 100 0 
8LW 67  33  67 33 74 26 
8MB 92  8  85 15 85 15 
8MW 76  24  68 32 72 28 
8SW 100  0  60 40 80 20 
                                                                                                                                                                  
13 If the ex-post performance were symmetrically distributed around  y* - uniform and independent normal 
distributions, among others, would be the case – one would expect 25% of the observations to jointly attain both 
reference points.  Under the symmetry hypothesis, the expected share of performances attaining  y**  is 1/9 = 11%.   
There is no reason,  however,  to expect symmetry.  As a matter of fact,  we find a positive tradeoff between wage 
growth and risk-on-the-job also at the cell-level  (par. 9), implying that the dispersion around the reference points is 
positively sloped.       21
 
The low frequency of joint attainment can be explained by the fact that  recession began to 
creep in the Italian economy  in 1992, reaching its trough in 1994.  Employment took a downturn  
in many industries, well below what could have been reasonably expected at the beginning of the 
Nineties.  Many individuals who decided to change job in those years may have expressed over-
optimistic predictions of risk-on-the-job, and such optimism affected performance relative to  their 
reference targets. Tab.2 (col. 3) displays also the hypothetical joint attainment of  y*  if employment 
trends in 1991-94 were the same as in the preceding 1986-91 time-window: here, therefore,  ROJ is 
held constant at the pre 1991-level.  Not surprisingly the attainment  frequency would have been 
higher in all cells, except the few where, inspite of the recession, employment increased beyond the 
1991-level. 
 
It is worth noticing that, with few exceptions, the share of observations jointly above the 
reference points is not drastically different across cells, independently of the fact that some strongly 
dominate others.  This suggest that, in relative terms, individuals obtain similar degrees of 
satisfaction vis-à-vis the attainment of reference points, whether their own environment (and only 
their own) is a favourable one or not.   
 
 
8.4 Distance from reference points   
A different measure of within-cell variability is the Euclidean distance computed as follows: 
 
D(k)  = sqrt [1/n Σ (W(i,k) – W(k)*)**2 +  (ROJ(i,k) – ROJ(k)*)**2] 
 
where  n  is the number of observations in the  k-th  cell.  
 
In fig. 7   D(k) is plotted against the utility [U = W/ROJ] associated with the reference points 
of each cell  U[y*(k)].  The higher U[y*(k)],  the closer the reference point to the theoretical 





















Figure 7 :   D(k) in the ordinate, U[y*(k)] in the abscissa. 
 
The large  U – differentials among  the D(k)  reflect  the position of the reference points in  
<W – ROJ> space, and the relative dominance of some cells over others.  The plot  reveals a slight 
negative association between  D(k)  and the utility  U[y*(k)] associated with the k-th reference 
point.  In cells with high  U[y*(k)], closer to the theoretical efficiency frontier, there seems to be 
less variability (distance) than in cells removed from the frontier.  Alternatively we might say that 
“small” clusters appear to be closer to the efficiency frontier than the “large” ones.  This is, 
however, a fragile finding, for which we have no satisfactory explanation.  
 
8.5 Inter-cell mobility 
 
Bounded rationality suggests that individuals will search for new opportunities in their own 
specific environment.  In this exploration  the local environment of each agent is defined by his cell. 
Mobility across cells is indeed somewhat limited:  40%  of the movers do not change cell;  65%  of 
the movers do not change industry, although they move within each industry across firms of 
different size class;  88%  of the movers from manufacturing sectors do not leave manufacturing;  
76%  of the movers from service industries remain in the services.  In addition, less than 4% of all 
movers change geographical area.  
Bounded rationality may be one answer to low inter-industry mobility, but it is not the only 
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8.6 Is all this sufficient evidence in favour of bounded rationality ?  
  
This question is the crucial one.  Let us review what might be reasonably expected under the 
hypothesis of full rationality: 
 
- greater dispersion around reference points.  Reference points are irrelevant for utility 
maximizing agents, unless utility is reference-based.
14    But if this is the case, we are already 
stepping in the field of bounded rationality; 
    
-   more clustering in the vicinity of the efficiency frontier. We have argued that resorting to 
unobserved heterogeneity in order to justify the vast majority of dominated observations in the           
<W – ROJ>  space leads into a black box where any empirical argument aimed at understanding  
how people make choices becomes irrelevant.  Full rationality is assumed and cannot be disproved.    
 
-  possibly, high(er) inter-cell mobility, reflecting substantial search activity across industries 
and firm sizes.  This argument is tempered by the fact that the mere existence of specific human 
capital would lead to predictions similar to the ones suggested by bounded rationality. 
 
None of the above expectations are confirmed in this exploration.  Thus our  conclusion is 
all in favour of the hypothesis of bounded rationality.  
 
The rest of the paper is devoted to pointing out that hints of sound individual rationality are 
(fortunately) all but absent even in the data under scrutiny here. 
 
9 The trade-off  between real wage growth and risk-on-the-job 
 
   9.1  OLS  estimation  
 
The existence of a trade-off between real wage growth and risk-on-the-job is to be expected 
not only among fully rational agents, but also among boundedly rational ones.  Among the latter, 
however,  we would also expect  a  trade-off between deviations of wage growth and risk-on-the-
                                                 
14 It could be argued that the reservation wage of  standard job matching theory is likely to be related to the reference 
points of the model of bounded rationality under scrutiny here, although in empirical work it is often measured by the 
unemployment benefits, which are, however, equal for all. This argument may be have some truth, but it does not affect 
our contention.   
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job from the relevant reference points.  We estimate the tradeoff  with the following  linear model 
on all the (voluntary) movers: 
(1) [(W(i,k) - W*(k)] =  α  + β [ROJ(i,k)- ROJ*(k)] + γ X(i,k) +  d I(k) +  e INTER(i,k) +  u(i)  
  where the  i-th mover belongs to the k-th cell.  X(i,k) are numerical covariates: age & age-square, 
  last wage (in the firm of origin for the movers, in 1991 for the stayers),  number of working days 
  reported during last job spell, number and timing of job switches before the last move, length of 
  unemployment spells between jobs, initial conditions 1986  (proxied by the ratio of individual wage 
  to average firm wage);  I(k)  dummy of cell indicators: 2 skill groups, 9 industries, 4 geographical 
  areas, 3 firm sizes;  INTER(i,k):  all relevant interactions.
15   Endogeneity of ROJ  should not be 
  much of a problem,  as ROJ is estimated from worker-specific covariates prior to 1991, and forward 
  looking firm-specific elements. We return to this problem in the next paragraph. 
 
9.2 Removing individual fixed effects from wage growth 
Equation  (1) is estimated on a cross-sectional sample in the 1991-94  time window.  It 
would be inappropriate – in addition to being unfeasible given the nature of the data - to perform 
fixed individual effects estimation on this specification.  A “within” estimate would show the trade-
off of the individual agents through time, with no explanation left for the enormous dominance 
relations that we observe across individuals. What we need is a “between” estimator that 
emphasizes such differences.   
There are, nonetheless, reasons to suspect that fixed individual characteristics are present in 
the  l.h.s. variable (W-W*)  per se: individual wage growth is, to some extent, “negotiated” between 
employer and employee, and the latter’s own characteristics will affect the bargain.  Fixed 
individual effects are, instead, under control in (ROJ – ROJ*):   ROJ is the ratio between  the 
individual likelihood of dismissal in the 1986-91 window, and the firm-specific employment trend 
between 1991 and 1994.  The numerator has been estimated with appropriate controls for initial 
conditions, while the denominator contains only firm-specific elements. 
                                                 
15  This model – aside from the fact that it is expressed in deviations from a reference point - is similar to the 
specification derived from theoretical equilibrium conditions of job search theory:  
ln wage (i) =  f (B,  theta, nu, r ) + g (X(i)-controls) + residuals (i) 
ln individual wage is the l.h.s.  In the r.h.s. we find  B =  unemployment benefits, a proxy of the reservation wage,  theta 
= labor market thickness (or arrival rate of a job offer); nu = bargaining strength, a shift factor;  r =   a discounting 
factor incorporating all future dynamics.  B, theta, nu, r   are estimated and/or calibrated cross section and/or time 
varying average values.   “Theta” and  our “risk-on-the-job” convey similar  (but opposite) concepts of job stability  / 
instability.  Thus, the implicit tradeoff between wages and job stability is negative, while it is positive according to our 
formulation.  
   25
Removing fixed effects from wage growth is feasible as both  individual  W  and ROJ are 
observable in the 1991-94 window as well as in the previous 1986-91 period.
16  W e  u s e  f i r s t  
difference estimation on a standard specification of   W  that includes the covariates present in (1),  
Let  W(0,i)  be the wage increase of the i-th individual in the time window 1986-81, and W(1,i) in 
the next 1991-94 window. 
 
We use the specification used in the OLS version, with X  numerical covariates and  I  dummy-
indicators, and take differences:     
 
  W (0,i) =  α(i)  +  β *  X(0,i)  +  γ * I(0,i) +  res(0,i)   
  W (1,i) =  α(i) +  β *  X(1,i)  +  γ * I(1,i)  + res(1,i) 
 
Δ W(i) = W(1,i) – W(0,i)  = β *  [X(1,i) - X(0,i)] +  γ * [I(1,i) - I(0,i)]  
+ [res(1,i) - res(0,i)] 
 
which allows to retrieve  β^^ and   γ^^  coefficients non contaminated by individual effects.   
 
We obtain  non-contaminated predictors of   W(1,i)   as follows: 
        
W(1,i)^^ =  β^^ *  X(1,i) +  γ^^ * I(1,i)  +  mean[W(0,i)] 
         
and re-estimate (1) with W(1,i)^^  in place of  W(i)
  
 
(2)  [(W(i,k)^^- W*(k)] = α + β [ROJ(i,k)- ROJ*(k)] + γ X(i,k) + d I(k) 
+ e INTER(i,k) +  u(i,k)  
 
We display here the  OLS estimates of the two trade-offs, the first one with  (W-W*)  in the 
l.h.s., and the second one with the non-contaminated  (W – W*)^^.   Both dependent variables, as 
well as  (ROJ – ROJ*) have been normalized.  
Table 3: Estimation of trade-off equations (1) and (2)  
              Reference point  W* =  [P50(W), P50(ROJ)] 
 
  OLS  estimates  after elimination of fixed 
individual effects  in  W 
White  - 0.182  - 1.098   **** 
(ROJ - ROJ*)  - 0.027    0.078  ** 
(ROJ - ROJ*) x white  - 0.119  *    0.053 
Small firm 1991    0.070    - 0.073 
Large firm  1991    0.010    1.920  **** 
Moves    0.390  ***    0.094  * 
Ineq86  - 0.479   **  - 0.660  *** 
Ineq86 x white    0.400    **    0.145 
Industry dummies 1991     n.s.    yes  *** 
Age & age**2    n.s.    n.s. 
R*2      0.14    0.52 
 
                                                 
16   ROJ  1986-91 is  estimated simply as the predicted likelihood of layoff in that period, setting the denominator equal 
to (1 + 0.25).  See footnote (   ).     26
Note: */ ** / *** / ****/  significant at  0.90,  0.95,  0.99 and 0.999 confidence levels. 
 
The comparative size of   Adj R-square  (0.14  vs. 0.52)  simply reflects the much smaller 
variability of the non-contaminated predictors  (W^^ - W*)  used as dependent variable,  compared 
to the   (W-W*)  inclusive of individual effects.   
The trade-off between wage growth and risk-on-the-job deviations, consistent with rational 
behaviour, must be positively sloped because higher wage growth compensates for higher risk of 
job loss.  It is observable and robustly positive in the non-contaminated  (W^^- W*) version - the 
estimated coefficient is 0.078, and possibly somewhat larger for the white-collars - while it is below 
significance (and negative) in the standard OLS version.
17   
Additional and interesting indications from equation [2] are to be mentioned:  (i) the white-collars 
are severely penalized vis-à-vis manual workers in terms of wage growth deviations from the 
reference target. This result, at first sight surprising, suggests a certain dose of overconfidence on 
potential targets among white-collar workers, unmatched among the blue-collars.  As a matter of 
fact, long run wage growth, per se  - i.e. not its deviation from W* - is higher among the white-
collars;  (ii)  the large firm-size effect - explaining the two clusters of observations (fig.--) – with 
large firm employees (in 1991) ending up much better than movers from small firms; (iii)  the 
INEQ86 indicator of initial conditions, pointing to the fact that the attainment of the wage growth 
target is, ceteris paribus, more problematic the higher one’s initial wage relative to the average 
wage paid by their 1986 - firm; (iv)  the “moves“ dummy (number of job switches), suggesting that 
individuals who made more than one job change – a rational choice following bad outcomes with 
the first switch (see par. 11)  - improve their chances of wage growth attainment;  
(v)  the high significance of industry and skill dummies is counter-intuitive.  All observations, once 
expressed in deviations from relevant targets, are compressed towards the origin. Thus, the impact 
of cell-specific dummies may be expected to vanish.  But, as fig. 7 shows, the dominance of some 
cells is still very evident:  white-collar cells are dominated; some industries and large firms 
outperform others.       
Estimation has been performed  also on wage growth and risk-on-the-job in levels, and not only on 
deviations from the reference points.  Results are available, but not displayed here. Differences are 
                                                 
17  As previously explained, the argument on the potential endogeneity of ROJ (on the grounds that it may be weakly, 
yet jointly determined with W) is a fragile one.  We have, nonetheless, estimated a TSLS  version of the tradeoff,  with 
ROJ  replaced by its predictor from a reduced form that includes all cell dummies.  The results differ only marginally 
from those reported above, with ROJ losing  some of its significance.  If, instead,  the tradeoff  were estimated  
regressing ROJ  against  W^^ and  covariates, the procedure would be equivalent  to  TSLS estimation.  Also these 
results are available and yield conclusions similar to the ones reported here.  
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minor. The only interesting one relates to the white-collar dummy, which – as expected – does not 
show any  penalization of the white-collars as the one reported for wage growth expressed in 
deviations from the reference point. 
 
 
10. A quasi-counterfactual analysis: movers vs. matching stayers 
It would be enlightening if we could respond to the question "how would the (voluntary) 
movers have performed had they decided not to move ?". Direct evidence is, obviously,  not 
available. But the data allow to observe the history and performance of a certain number of 
individuals of the same skill group,  co-workers in the firm from which the movers' job switch 
originated.
18  
We link each mover to his observable stayer co-workers.  This can be done in two ways: 
firstly by linking to stayers in the same firm of origin; secondly by linking to stayers in the same 
cell of origin. In principle the first linkage is more correct than the second. But it leads to a much 
smaller sample size: 220 groups with at least 3 individuals observed contemporarily (out of  1594 
movers in the whole panel).  The second is less accurate but the linkage can be done for each 
mover.  We illustrate the results of the second linkage, which turns out to be very similar to the first 
one.    
The stayer co-workers ("matching stayers") of the same skill group represent a quasi-
counterfactual: they are as similar as possible to the movers at the beginning of the observation 
period.  There is, however, an important qualification which turns out to strengthen our conclusion: 
as explained in par. 5.1,  we cannot single out the “voluntary” stayers, i.e. those who have been 
faced with options similar to those offered to his colleague mover (and have turned them down)  
from the “involuntary” ones. Thus the set of “matching stayers” is more inclusive than what we 
would like to have: this implies that we are about to compare the performance of voluntary movers 
with individuals who are somewhat worse off than we would like to have as a comparative group. 
This, as will be seen, strengthens our conclusions.     
The PREMIUM for the i-th individual mover, defined as the ratio between his own 
performance indicator (benchmark utility, wage growth, risk-on-the-job)  and that of his median 
matching stayers:   
PREMIUM [U(i)]  = U[mover(i)] /  U[med (matching-stayers(i))]   
PREMIUM [W(i)] = W[mover(i)] / W[med (matching-stayers(i))]     
                                                 
18  The WHIP sample is drawn from the population  of individual workers, the sampling ratio being approximately 1:90. 
This procedure leads to a modest oversampling of the large firms vs. the small ones: on average we observe 10 workers 
on the payroll of a company with  900 employees,  but only 1 worker employed by firms with less than  50 employees 
(if at all).    28
PREMIUM [ROJ(i)]  =  ROJ[mover(i)] / ROJ [med(matching-stayers(i))]    
indicates the relative performance of the i-th mover  vis-à-vis his median matching stayers. 
The following fig. 8-10 summarize the information derived from the PREMIUM-
percentiles, computed separately for blue and white-collars.  Among the manual workers, the 
median mover performs worse than his median matching stayer: in about 60% of the cases we 
observe  PREMIUM < 1. Among the white-collars, instead, the comparative performance is split at 




























































































Fig.  10  A      Fig.  10  B 
This leads us to conclude that the evidence of  "sound" decisions of the (voluntary) movers 
relative to their matching stayers is rather weak, whether blue or white-collars. The answer to the 
question "how would the movers have performed had they decided not to move" would have to be  
"often times they might have performed better". 
Two arguments reinforce the claim: (i)  our matching stayers include the “involuntary” ones, 
i.e. those who have not been faced with any option other than sticking to their post. Thus the 
median stayers’ utility, as defined here,  is lower than that of the median “voluntary” stayers which 
would have provided a more precise counterfactual. Despite this qualification, our results suggest 
that the matching stayers often do better than the movers; (ii) alternative parametrizations of the 
benchmark utility either improve the relative performance of the matching stayers (fig. 10 A; m=1, 
n=3), or change it only marginally (fig.10 B; m=3, n=1).  
 
 
11. ...But there are also hints of rational response following unpleasant events  
Hints of rational response (fortunately) appear among the movers when the events take a 
downturn  after the first job switch.  Low wage growth and / or  big employment losses at the firm 
level elicit attempts to search in new directions and make additional moves in the three-year 




































PREMIUM (UTILITY)  with varying parameters m and   n
MATCHING STAYERS BETTER OFF THAN MOVERS 
UNDER ALTERNATIVE PARAMETRIZATION OF UTILITY  30
window following the first switch.  Likewise behave individuals who have been at (paid) work only 
a few number of days in recent years. This could be subjectively interpreted as a signal of 
forthcoming dismissal.  A simple probit regression of the probability of  job change suggests a 
robust causal link between low values of  W and  high ROJ  in the r.h.s., and the likelihood of a new 
job change among the blue-collars, and even more pronounced among the white-collars.  Results 




In this paper we explore the performance of Italian workers along a decade (1986-1996)  and 
assess the degree of “rationality” of individuals who have been faced with outside options and have 
voluntarily decided to make a job change.  Bounded rationality, as opposed to the full rationality of 
utility maximizing agents, suggests that individuals will search for new options capable to attain 
“satisfactory” targets  (aspirations levels, standards, norms),  based on conditions prevailing in their 
own local environments. Our empirical strategy consists of appropriately defining such 
environments (cells) and observing the ex-post individual performance in relation to the degree of 
dispersion, clustering and mobility within and between cells. 
Under full rationality the following are to be expected:  
(i)  high inter-cell mobility,  
(ii) large dispersion around the reference targets;  
(iii)  clustering in the vicinity of the efficiency frontier.  
None of the above priors are confirmed in this exploration.  In addition, our estimates 
confirm the existence of a trade-off between real wage growth and risk-on-the-job, which is to be 
expected not only among fully rational agents, but also among boundedly rational ones.  Finally, a 
counterfactual analysis of the voluntary movers’ performance vis-à-vis the stayers’ provides 
additional support to our intuition.   
Our conclusion is that workers behave according to principles of rationality that seem distant 
from those of “full rationality” assumed in the majority of contemporary empirical (and theoretical) 
studies.  The idea of “bounded rationality” à la Simon provides a better fit to our observations.  
If  this assessment  is correct, the implications are powerful: are there reasons to believe that 
such patterns are found only in the context of job search and worker mobility and not in more 
general instances of economic behaviour ?  Our survey of recent literature on bounded rationality 
strongly suggests the contrary.  Why, then, should economists leave unchallenged and 
unchallengeable the hypothesis of full rationality ?         31
It is our hope to have drawn attention to methodological issues that look important, and that 
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